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ON DENNETT'S CONDITIONS OF PERSONHOOD 
Fredric C. Young 
Daniel Dennett, in "Conditions of Personhood," Richard 
Rorty, ed., The Identities of Persons (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1976), writes on the 
concept of a person. In this paper I shall a) discuss 
Dennett's six conditions for personhood, b) offer 
objections to some of his conditions and c) show how his 
concept of a person may be, in one sense, too broad and, 
in another, too narrow. 
Dennett doubts whether we can ever come up with a 
satisfactory theory of personhood. He cautions: "In the 
end we may come to realize that the concept of a person is 
incoherent and obsolete." This is in spite of the fact 
that "it is difficult or even impossible to conceive of 
what it would be like if we abandoned the concept . . . 1 1 
(p. 175). For Dennett, it turns out that we lack 
objective criteria for applying the notion, and 
accordingly, it may add nothing to our knowledge. 
But aside from incoherence and obsolescence, a concept 
of the person could fail in being empty. Dennett states: 
"If then the concept of a person is in some way an 
ineliminable part of our conceptual scheme, it might still 
be in rather worse shape than we would like. It might 
turn out, for instance, that the concept of a person is 
only a free-floating honorific that we are all happy to 
apply to ourselves, and to others as the spirit moves us, 
guided by our emotions, aesthetic sensibilities, 
considerations of policy, and the like, just as those who 
are chic are all and only those who can get themselves 
considered chic by others who consider themselves chic. 
Being a person is certainly something like that, and if it 
were no more, we would have to reconsider if we could the 
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importance with which we now endow the concept" (p. 176).''' 
This then is the Scylla and Charibdis that an adequate 
theory of the person must avoid. That is, such a theory 
must show why the concept is coherent and usable on the 
one hand, and unlike the concept of chic, on the other. 
To add to our problems, we seem to have two separate 
but intertwining ideas of a person: the metaphysical and 
the moral. As to the former, it stipulates that a thing 
is a person only if, roughly, it is an intelligent, 
conscious, feeling agent. The moral concept of a person 
is of a being who is morally accountable; it is 
appropriate either to praise or blame or ascribe to him 
rights and responsibilities. So the philosopher's task 
becomes suitably complicated as he considers the question: 
"Does the metaphysical notion [of a person] . . . coincide 
with the moral notion?" (p. 176). 
Dennett does not even attempt to solve all of these 
problems and come up with a comprehensive theory of the 
person. Instead, he outlines six necessary conditions for 
a thing's being a person in the moral sense. He conceives 
of his task as follows: "What will be at issue here is 
first, how . . . they [the six conditions] are dependent 
on each other; second, why they are necessary conditions 
of moral personhood, and third, why it is so hard to say 
whether they are jointly sufficient conditions for moral 
personhood" (p. 177). Dennett tries to answer all three 
questions. 
Now, I shall present Dennett's six conditions. They 
are as follows: 
1) "The first and most obvious theme is that persons 
are rational beings" (p. 177). Dennett does not fully 
discuss what he means here. However, for him, rationality 
seems to involve at least as much and possibly more than 
following the economist's principle of rationality. The 
latter states: an agent is rational just in case he 
maximizes his utility (or profit) and minimizes his 
disutility (or cost). This rule does not legislate ends, 
but rather stipulates that someone's being rational is 
that entity's choosing the most effective means to an end, 
i.e., the one which will maximize his benefit. Dennett 
may also have in mind something like Aristotle's concept 
of "reasonableness": a notion that there are some ends, 
e.g., misery, that it is never rational to choose. A 
rational being is, so to speak, a sensible being. 
2) "The second theme is that persons are beings to 
which states of consciousness are attributed, or to which 
psychological or mental or Intentional predicates, are 
ascribed" (p. 177). The term "Intention" (with a large-
case "I") is a technical one for Dennett. It does not 
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mean intentions in the ordinary sense, i.e., it does not 
refer to motives or purposes alone. The term instead 
refers to any mental state, e.g., volition, emotion, 
feeling, intention, imagination, etc., which we would 
normally say is about something. That is to say, an 
emotion, like fear, is never simply fear. It is always 
fear of something. And hope may spring eternal, but it is 
hope that something will happen. Or consciousness is 
always consciousness of something. And thus the term "is 
conscious" is an Intentional predicate in Dennett's usage. 
I will speak more about this below, as well as explain the 
significance of Intentions. 
3) "The third theme is that, whether something counts 
as a person depends in some way on an attitude taken 
toward it, a stance adopted with respect to it. This 
theme suggests that it is not the case that once we have 
established the objective fact that something is a person 
we treat him or her or it in a certain way, but that our 
treating him or her or it this certain way is somehow and 
to some extent constitutive of him or her or it being a 
person" (pp. 177-8). 
I want to introduce a distinction which, I think, will 
enable us to understand Dennett more clearly. Namely, I 
wish to distinguish between someone's being a person de re 
and his being a person de dictu. X's being a person de re 
involves X's really being a person, i.e., it entails that 
it is an objective fact that he meet Dennett's conditions 
of personhood. Take the Untermenschen in Nazi Germany, 
for example, the Jews. If anything can count as such, 
they were, in fact, persons. And this was true, 
regardless of the stance that the rulers of Germany, or 
anybody else, adopted toward them, namely, that they were 
nonpersons. In short, in the de re sense, it is. not the 
case that a thing is a person if and only if we treat it 
as such. But in the de dictu sense of "being a person", 
this would be true. This is perhaps what Dennett had in 
mind when he said that the concept of a person is 
something (although of course not entirely) like the 
concept of chic. A person is never de re chic, i.e., 
there are no objective criteria to establish whether 
"chic" is true of him. He is chic if and only if people 
adopt a certain stance toward him. He is chic de dictu. 
Similarly, stance is constitutive of a thing's in the de 
dictu sense, being a pex'son. This will be the stance, 
needless to say, that ascribes to it the conditions of 
personhood. 
4) "The fourth theme is that the object toward which 
this personal stance is taken must be capable of 
reciprocating in some way . . . . This reciprocity has 
sometimes been rather uninformatively expressed by the 
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slogan: to be a person is to treat others as persons . . 
. " (p. 178). I shall discuss this condition below. 
5) "The fifth theme is that persons must be capable 
of verbal communication. This condition handily excuses 
nonhuman animals from full personhood and the attendant 
moral responsibility, and seems at least implicit in all 
social contract theories of ethics" (p. 178). It is hard 
to know quite what to make of this condition. Strictly 
speaking, in one way, it is simply false. A deaf/mute,' 
who is incapable of verbal communication, is surely a 
person. And so is an autistic child, who is incapable, in 
any respect, of communication with other moral agents. 
The child has rights and responsibilities, and we may hold 
him morally accountable. We may excuse him from his 
responsibilities, and fail to punish him or blame him due 
to his plight. But in so doing, seemingly, we are aware 
that we are excusing a moral agent, or person in the moral 
sense, and not that we are dealing with something 
subpersonal. 
But perhaps my distinction between de re and de dictu 
senses of being a person can rescue Dennett here. That 
is, an agent need not be, in reality, capable of verbal 
communication. And all that we need for X's fulfilling 
this condition of personhood is that we treat him as if he 
could verbally communicate. However, there are 
difficulties in this reply which may become clearer below 
in a more extensive discussion on how to deal with 
problems in Dennett's view. 
6) "The sixth theme is that persons are 
distinguishable from other entities by being conscious in 
some special way: there is a way in which we are 
conscious in which no other species is conscious. 
Sometimes this is identified as self-consciousness of one 
sort or another" (p. 178). 
Dennett argues that these conditions, however 
necessary they might be, are not jointly sufficient. His 
reasoning is as follows. These conditions make the 
concept of a person inescapably normative, i.e., an ideal 
standard. He states: "Human beings or other entities 
can only aspire to being approximations of the ideal, and 
there can be no way to set a 'passing grade' that is not 
arbitrary. Were the six conditions (strictly interpreted) 
considered sufficient they would not ensure that any 
actual entity was a person, for nothing would ever fulfill 
them . . . " (p. 193). That is to say, because of the 
normative character of the concept of the person, there 
may not be an object which is de re a person . This will 
get Dennett into trouble, as we shall see. 
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But first I shall discuss Dennett's notion of an 
Intentional system. The first three conditions of being a 
person, rationality, Intentionality, and stance do not 
define a person, but a much wider class of objects. These 
are Intentional systems. Dennett says: "An Intentional 
system is a system whose behavior can be (at least 
sometimes) explained and predicted by relying on 
ascriptions to the system of beliefs and desires (and 
other Intentionally characterized featuresT what I will 
call Intentions . . .) [see above] . . . There may in 
every case be other ways of predicting and explaining the 
behavior of an Intentional system, for instance, 
mechanistic or physical ways, but the Intentional stance 
may be the handiest or most effective or in any case a 
successful stance to adopt, which suffices for the object 
to be an Intentional system" (p. 179). 
An object is an Intentional system if and only if we 
can appropriately or justly or correctly say of it that it 
performed an act, or caused an event because it wanted to, 
or because it believed that it was the right thing to do, 
or because it feared the consequences if it did not, etc. 
Or in other words, a system is Intentional just in case we 
can explain or predict its behavior, to employ an old 
scholastic term, in teleological ways. If it is 
appropriate to ask of it "Why did it do that?" and receive 
an answer in terms of Intentions, then that object or 
system is an Intentional one. 
Dennett goes on to say that "It is important to 
recognize how bland this definition of Intentional system 
is, and how correspondingly large the class of 
Intentional systems can be. If, for instance, 1 predict 
that a particular plant—say a potted ivy, will grow 
around a corner and up into the light because it 'seeks' 
the light and 'wants' to get out of the shade it now finds 
itself in, and 'expects' or 'hopes* there is light around 
the corner, I have adoped the Intentional stance toward 
the plant and, lo and behold, within very narrow limits it 
works" (pp. 179-80). But further, we could treat a chess-
playing computer as wanting to win the game. And for that 
matter, if it were a successful stance to take towards 
them, then stones or other inanimate objects would be 
Intentional systems. 
It is important to realize some of the implications of 
the notion of an Intentional system. It is not simply 
that we can adopt the Intentional stance correctly toward 
only those objects which are objectively Intentional 
systems. For we may never, for Dennett, be able to do so 
with objective validity. So he is not using "being an 
Intentional system" in the de re sense. He is using it, 
rather, in the de dictu sense, i.e., he is saying that an 
object is an Intentional system just in case we adopt the 
Intentional stance toward it. If we ascx'ibe Intentions to 
an object, that constitutes its being an Intentional 
system. 
We can understand the condition of reciprocity in 
terms of Intentional systems. Dennett says: "Let us 
define a second-order Intentional system as one to which 
we ascribe not only simple beliefs, desires and other 
Intentions, but beliefs, desires, and other Intentions 
about beliefs, desires, and other Intentions. An 
Intentional system S would be a second-order Intentional 
system if among the ascriptions we make to it are such as 
S believes that T desires that p_, S hopes that T fears 
that g, and reflexive cases like S believes that S desires 
that p_" (p. 181). Reciprocity is simply the ability to 
form second-order Intentions. Paradigmatically, they may 
be about other agents' Intentions, but they need not be. 
And once again, a wide class of objects could be second-
order Intentional systems. We can ascribe second-order 
Intentionality to animals. Dennett gives the example of a 
dog who goes to the door, seems to want to get out, thus 
getting her Master to go to the door. The dog proceeds to 
hop on her Master's chair. We would say, for Dennett, 
that the dog hoped that her Master would believe she 
wanted out. This would not only be a second-order, but 
possibly a third-order Intention. Dennett says: "We can 
make this point more general : where x is 
attempting to induce behavior in y_ which is inappropriate 
to y's true environment and needs but appropriate to y_'s 
perceived or believed environment and needs, we are forced 
to ascribe second-order Intentions to x" (p. 183). 
X could even be a tree. Dennett gives the example of 
apple-growers "tricking" an apple tree into "thinking it's 
spring" by building a small fire under its branches in the 
late fall. It will bloom. Any time ascription of second-
order Intentions will help us understand or predict 
behavior, we are justified in so ascribing them. And once 
more, it does not matter whether these predicates are 
objectively true of the thing in question. For we are 
using the Intentional predicates once again in the de 
dictu sense, it is our attitude which constitutes a 
thing's being a second-order Intentional system. So it is 
this attitude which is essential to moral personhood. In 
short, a thing cannot be a person, in the de dictu sense, 
unless we adopt the stance toward it that it is a second-
order Intentional system. 
Finally, we can understand the condition of self-
awareness in terms of reciprocity. The former simply is a 
special case of the latter, involving, second-order 
volitions. A second-order voliiton is an Intention about 
one of our desires. I have a desire to stop writing this 
paper and to run down the street screaming. I have 
another desire about that desire, namely, to suppress it. 
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My desire to suppress a desire is a second-order desire. 
And a thing cannot be a person, unless we ascribe second-
order volitions to it. 
Now, there are some problems with equating the special 
way in which we must be self-aware with second-order 
volitions. For one thing, the latter is a technical 
notion that seems very difficult to match up with our 
ordinary concept of self-consciousness. When I am aware 
of myself, must I be aware of some of my Intentions? Why 
cannot I just be aware of me? And if I can be self-aware 
without consciousness of Intentions, then, I am inclined 
to think, I need not have a second-order volition.to be 
self-aware. But then self-awareness is not identical to 
having second-order volitions. But I shall not develop 
this objection, and proceed to some more serious ones. 
My main criticisms of Dennett divide neatly into two 
categories: a) I find difficulties with his notion that 
second-order Intentions and volitions are necessary for 
full moral personhood, and b) I find that if we take 
"being a person" in the de dictu sense, Dennett provides 
us with too broad a line of demarcation for personhood. 
If, on the other hand, we take "being a person" in a de re 
sense, Dennett's views suffer the opposite failing, and 
provide a much too narrow criterion for personhood. 
As to (a): I would like to begin with a discussion of 
two unfortunates. There is Jones, who due to an accident 
is paralyzed, deaf, dumb, and blind, and suffers from 
serious brain damage. The second story is about a moral 
monster. In both cases, the agents involved will lack 
second-order Intentions, and we will not ascribe any such 
quality to them. Yet, I will argue, we would adopt the 
attitude that the accident victim and the moral degenerate 
are persons in the moral sense, i.e., we would hold them 
morally accountable and grant them rights and 
responsibilities. 
Jones is unaware that any other agents exist due to 
his inability to speak, hear, see, move, or communicate. 
He merely has rudimentary thoughts. He only has desires 
about the world—to eat, sleep, evacuate, and to live. He 
is too weak to think reflectively about his condition. 
This is a plausible story. It may even be true of 
many people. But in Dennett's view, if we do not adopt 
the stance toward Jones that he is a second-order 
Intentional system, then he is not, in the relevant sense, 
a person. But I take it that, intuitively, we feel that 
even if we do not ascribe to Jones second-order 
Intentions, and say we do not, we would still adopt the 
stance toward him that he is a person. This seems the 
only way to account for our empathetic reactions to 
.168 
individuals in plights similar to his. Now, Dennett would 
be hard-pressed to explain why the latter stance would not 
be constitutive of personhood. We are treating Jones as a 
person, and it seems entirely arbitrary to say on 
Dennett's view that this would fail to make Jones such. 
But if this stance makes Jones a person, then it is the 
case that (1) Jones has de dictu personhood and (2) he 
lacks one of Dennett's necessary conditions for such 
status. 
But Dennett could reply that he is eguating moral 
personhood with the conditions of moral accountability, 
and those by which individuals have rights and 
responsibilities. And given our acknowledgement of 
Jones's situation, it is impossible to see how we could 
treat him as either praiseworthy or blameworthy. After 
all, he can barely function. So Jones is not, de dictu, a 
person. And our case cannot work as a counter-example. 
But it is not true, in principle, that we would not be 
in a position to either praise or blame Jones. Jones 
cannot encounter us. But suppose we could encounter him. 
For example, say we could read his mind, and we found him 
thinking, "I want to live." 
This would give Jones a first-order Intention, but not 
a second-order Intention. He feels no pride, shame, hope, 
etc., over his wish to live, and he is as unaware of his 
thinking it as he is that there are other agents. 
However, even believing that he lacks second-order 
Intentions, we could either praise or blame him for his 
wish to live. Depending on our moral standards, we could, 
e.g., praise him for his courage in adversity or blame him 
for being so selfish, as his survival places demands on 
those who must attend him. 
Moreover, we would grant Jones rights. We may give 
him the right to life, or alternatively, the right to die 
in dignity. And we may ascribe responsibilities to him, 
e.g., the responsibility not to want to live, although we 
may excuse him, if under the circumstances he fails to 
live up to them. So Dennett's reply does not work. 
Now, I wish to talk about a moral monster. I will 
first say that to have second-order Intentions does not 
seem to be a necessary condition of being a person in the 
metaphysical sense. The latter concept is of an 
intelligent, conscious, feeling agent. 
And we can surely imagine creatures who are 
intelligent, conscious and have feelings but only have 
first-order Intentions. That is, they have beliefs, 
wishes, desires, etc., about objects. But they never have 
beliefs, wishes, desires, etc., about beliefs, desires, 
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and wishes. They are totally unreflective. There is 
nothing self-contradictory, or absured in this suggestion. 
I imagine these creatures in order to block, an obvious 
objection to the Jones story. That is, Jones is a 
defective human being and our notion of a person is so 
bound up in the notion of human beings that we sometimes 
equate the two (although Dennett does not). And I take 
it, it is normal for us to ascribe to human beings second-
order Intentions. So the Jones case is abnormal and could 
be treated as an exception to the rule. 
But what of creatures for which it is normal to lack 
second-order Intentions? Even if they were nonhuman, 
would we consider these beings to be morally accountable 
and to possess rights and responsibilities? I submit that 
we would. 
Our creature's name is Grundy. Grundy believes that 
the world is full of hostile automata who are a threat to 
him. He wishes to kill them. But the automata he is 
trying to destroy are human beings. But Grundy does not 
think of us as Intentional systems, but as machines. This 
stipulation exists as he has no Intentions about our 
Intentions. 
Grundy is caught and brought to justice. It is at 
least intuitively plausible to suggest that even if we 
fail to adopt the stance toward him that he is a second-
order Intentional system, we would hold him accountable 
for his wrong-doings. Pre-analytically there is nothing 
irrational per se in this supposition. Someone has to pay 
for his crimes, and he seems the best candidate, having 
committed them. 
And yet if it were a necessary condition for our 
holding Grundy morally accountable that we ascribe to him 
second-order Intentions, it would not be reasonable for us 
to suppose we can blame him. In fact, we, it seems, would 
not even recognize him as a being that we could rightfully 
hold responsible for his actions. If Dennett is right, we 
would not consider him a person, and the question of his 
guilt or innocence is closed. It would be as mistaken to 
suppose he had ethical responsibilities as it would to 
hold that of any non-person, e.g., an adding machine. So 
either Dennett is wrong, or our ethical intuitions about 
the conditions of punishment are. This is also shown by 
the following. 
How is Dennett to account for our notions of strict 
liability? There are times in which we blame or punish an 
agent and the question as to whether he has Intentions 
does not even arise. An employer is liable for damages to 
his employee, whether or not we hold he had any Intention 
to commit the injury. And in times past, we have held in 
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the Anglo-American legal tradition that horses were liable 
for throwing their Masters. And the only consideration 
was whether the animal in fact did the act, not whether we 
held that he have second-order Intentions. 
Not only do we punish agents we hold lacking in 
second-order Intentions, we ascribe to them rights and 
responsibilities. Except metaphorically, we do not think 
a corporation has Intentions of any kind, yet we give it 
rights and liabilities. We also praise it when it has 
done something worthy, and blame it when it has done 
something reprehensible. 
So given our ordinary ways of ascribing moral 
personhood, i.e., of holding an agent accountable with 
rights and responsibilities, the question of whether or 
not we hold the agent to be a first-order, much less a 
higher-order Intentional system, is irrelevant. So we pay 
a high price, if we accept Dennett's view over our ethical 
intuitions, for we will have to substantially revise our 
ordinary notion of moral personhood. And even if we are 
willing to do this, it remains a fact that Dennett has not 
explicated our concept of a person, but rather legislated 
it. 
So it seems from the above that Dennett is wrong in 
thinking that an Intentional stance which ascribes second-
order Intentions to an object is a necessary condition of 
its being, at least in the de dictu sense, a person. For 
there are some examples ~Tn which (a) we adopt a stance 
toward X that it is morally accountable with rights and 
responsibilities, thereby, on Dennett's view, constituting 
it as a person, and (b) we fail to adopt the Intentional 
stance that the same X have second-order Intentions. 
But let us suppose that the above objections are not 
sound. Even so, Dennett is in for trouble. For it seems 
that his criteria for moral personhood may be at once too 
broad and too narrow. 
It would seem that it is simply a matter of attitude 
whether an object is an Intentional system in the de dictu 
sense. That is, the question as to whether the thing 
really has Intentions or not is, in some crucial way, 
irrelevant to its being a person in this sense. Partly 
this is because the concept of Intentional system is 
normative, that is, no object may in fact make the grade 
and be one. So if the factual nature of an object were 
relevant to our ascriptions of personhood, we would, if we 
did the rational thing, suspend judgement on whether 
anything was a person. But for Dennett it is not rational 
to so refuse to judge. So the factual nature of the 
objects cannot matter to our adopting the Intentional 
stance. 
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Whether we behave toward an object as if it were an 
Intentional system is, then, in the de dictu sense, 
constitutive of its being an Intentional system. But 
then, why cannot we justifiably ascribe second-order 
Intentions to subhuman animate objects? It seems we can 
of some, for we do so, or fail to do so ad libitum for 
dogs, cats, even trees and ivy plants. But then, why 
cannot we do so for some inanimate objects? For Dennett, 
we in fact do so in the case of computers. We can also 
think of examples from our daily lives. I blame my 
typewriter for intending to cause me grief by making 
errors. I ascribe to my car when it fails to start 
intentions to anger me. And for Dennett, I am justified 
in doing so, if it helps me explain or predict the actions 
of my typewriter or automobile. 
This illustrates again that it cannot matter, for 
Dennett, whether the object in question is de re a higher-
order Intentional system. It- seems utterly dotty to 
suppose the car and the computer have second-order 
Intentions, For another thing, such ascriptions seem to 
violate Occam's Razor. That is, I can account for the 
erratic behavior of my car, or the chess-playing behavior 
of my computer simply by the laws of mechanics. So since 
to suppose the objects really have Intentions adds 
unnecessary entities to my ontology, I am obliged, by the 
principle of economy, to reject that supposition. 
And what of second-order volition? This is simply a 
special case of ascribing second-order Intentions. 
Although we cannot say, thereby, that the same license 
applies here (that would be the fallacy of division), it 
seems equally plausible, on Dennett's view, to ascribe 
these volitions to the same class of objects that we have 
ascribed second-order Intentions too. 
At least we can ascribe second-order volitions to 
inanimate objects. My television goes on the blink. Now, 
I know that certain sonic vibrations can bring about the 
set's return to good order. I also know that these sonic 
vibrations will be set off by an angry tone of voice and 
the sounds of my saying "You'd better shape up or else." 
(This is electronically feasible.) But instead of this 
mechanistic interpretation, I explain the phenomenon by 
the following. 
I think that the television intends to upset me by 
going on the blitz. But it knows by the tone of my voice 
that 1 am angry and will intend to harm it, if it does not 
shape up. It desired that its wishes upset me, but it is 
sorry and changes. This explanation does the following: 
a) it ascribes second-order Intentions to the television 
(It knows I am angry), b) it ascribes second-order 
volition to the set (It desired that its wishes upset m e ) , 
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c) it predicts the television's behavior. So Dennett 
would have to say the ascription of second-order 
Intentions and vglitions is proper for at least some 
inanimate objects. 
But we can force Dennett to say that we are able to, 
with propriety, adopt f ia higher-order Intentional stance 
toward all objects. This is to say the following: By 
"higher-order Intentional stance" I mean any attitude 
which ascribes higher-order Intentions, namely, at least 
first-order Intentionality, reciprocity, and second-order 
volition, to an object. We know that for Dennett we are 
justified in taking a higher-order Intentional stance 
toward an object if we can, using higher-order Intentional 
predicates, predict or explain its behavior. That is, if 
we can give a teleological explanation with predictive 
value of a thing's behavior in terms of first and second-
order Intentions and volitions, then we can properly adopt 
the higher-order Intentional stance toward that object. 
But arguably we can so understand the behavior of any 
object.. The above examples indicate at least some 
inanimate object's behavior can be explained 
teleologically, and it seems entirely arbitrary to exclude 
from the possibility of higher-order teleological 
explanation the behavior of any class of objects. 
How do we explain or predict the behavior of physical 
objects? We try to show that the behavior is an instance 
of an observed law-like regularity. For example, we 
notice that when two objects are contiguous, the one with 
the greater mass will attract the one with the lesser. We 
explain or predict this pheneomenon on the basis of the 
law-like regularities which we call the laws of 
gravitation. 
But such law-like regularities are describable 
teleologically. For example, "When two objects in space 
love each other and are self-aware of the feeling, they 
will intend to please each other by varying the 
gravitational attraction inversely with their distance and 
directly with their mass." And any time we witness the 
statistical or constant conjunction of event A with event 
B, we are licensed to predict the latter given the former. 
But we can equally well predict event B by talking of its 
self-conscious love of event A and its desire to please 
the latter. Evidence of these feelings is, of course, the 
fact that the two events are frequently or always, like 
two friends, contiguous. 
By parity of reasoning, any time we observe 
regularities, we can rephrase the predictions they license 
in terms of higher-order Intentional predicates after the 
manner I have just suggested. And since we can explain 
and predict the behavior of objects in terms of these 
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rephrased assertions, and, in principle, all natural 
events, then we would accordingly be warranted in taking 
the higher-order Intentional stance toward any of them. 
We should remember that the use of Intentional predicates 
does not have to make for the best, but only a possible 
explanation to license our taking the appropriate stance 
toward the thing explained. 
Nor can Dennett reply that I am overlooking a crucial 
consideration in the propriety of adopting a higher-order 
Intentional stance, namely, Morgan's Law of Parsimony. 
The latter would mandate that we ascribe de re only those 
Intentions to a thing needed to account for its behavior. 
This is one reason why factually no object may be an 
Intentional system, as we can, in principle, have a 
mechanistic, i.e., one which avoids all Intentional 
ascriptions, account of any object's behavior including 
that of ourselves. 
Now, suppose Dennett were to say, as he sometimes 
seems to, that we should also avoid taking an n-order 
Intentional stance toward an object when the simplest 
explanation which accounts for its behavior only need 
involve n-1 Intentions. That is, we should only adopt the 
stance that X is a higher-order Intentional system if 
higher-order Intentional predicates are not just a 
possible way but are necessary to account for X's 
behavior. And so, seeing as natural objects can be 
accounted for mechanistically, we would not, contra my 
point, be justified in treating them as Intentional 
systems. 
Given the real possibility of omnipresent mechanistic 
explanations of human behavior, it may turn out that not 
only factually may there be no persons, but we may not 
even be justified in considering an object to be a person. 
But then we could be mistaken in even adopting the stance 
that we are persons, i.e., we might not even be right in 
thinking that we can talk about ourselves as persons. And 
I think Dennett would find this an unacceptable 
conclusion. So it seems the law of parsimony cannot 
prescribe the kind of Intentional stance we take toward an 
object. 
And it cannot be that we would be mistaken in any of 
our higher-order Intentional ascriptions, for whether the 
object is de re a higher-order system is seemingly as 
irrelevant here as the analogous consideration was for 
lower-order Intentional systems. What would make the 
difference for Dennett? And what other rightful restraint 
could there be in ascribing the status as a higher-order 
Intentional system to an object, other than the one that 
the ascription is false, because the object de re is not a 
higher-order Intentional system? 
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So it seems Dennett is committed to saying that the 
class of objects we corisider higher-order Intentional 
systems is, in principle, co-extensive with the universal 
set. That is, it seems that we can justifiably adogt the 
higher-order Intentional stance toward any object." 
Now, this has several problems. It would seem 
counter-intuitive, if not plainly false, to say it is 
simply a matter of attitude, as distinct from a matter of 
factual considerations, whether I am correct in ascribing, 
e.g., to my car, the attributes of being a higher-order 
Intentional system. Now, it is true, we ascribe higher-
order Intentionality to many inanimate objects, but we 
often do not really believe we are right in so doing. 
When I rail at my shoes for willfully hiding from me in 
order to cause me grief in the morning, I recognize that I 
am being childish and mistaken. My shoes do not really 
want to hurt me; their behavior is explained by 
mechanistic laws. When we ascribe Intentional predicates 
to objects, even when it helps us understand them, we 
generally intuitively feel that the more appropriate 
interpretaion is mechanistic. 
How can we account for this intuition that Intentional 
ascription is inappropriate for some classes of objects, 
unless it very much matters to the appropriateness of my 
Intentional ascription whether the object is de re an 
Intentional system? If this is so, my attitude toward 
whether an object is an Intentional system needs 
justification and is not, seemingly, in itself 
constitutive of the object's personhood. I need to know 
that the object really is an Intentional system. That is, 
when we ascribe Intentional predicates, we are not using 
the de dictu sense of "being an Intentional system"; we 
use instead the de re sense. 
On Dennett's view, then, we reach the wildly counter-
intuitive conclusion that we are right in ascribing 
higher-order Intentionality to any object. We would be 
perfectly correct, right, or justified in saying of any 
stone, tree, liquid, etc., that it has higher-order 
Intentions. 
But what if Dennett were to abandon his belief that 
stance alone is constitutive of a thing's being a higher-
order Intentional system? And what if he were to say that 
we are only right in ascribing Intentions to those objects 
which, in a factual or de re sense, really have them? 
Then his necessary conditions for higher-order 
Intentionality do not provide too broad a criterion for 
higher-order Intentionality, but too narrow a one. Since 
persons are higher-order Intentional s y s t e m s a n d there 
may be, on Dennett's view, none of the latter, if an 
object can only be a person by really fulfilling Dennett's 
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conditions of personhood, then there may be no persons. 
In fact, he introduced stance as constitutive of what I 
have been calling de dictu personhood to avoid jusL Lhis 
situation. 
I take it that it is not possible for us to be 
mistaken that there are, in some sense, persons. It seems 
t unimaginable that I am not a person, and the same would 
•t presumably apply to my readers. Dennett even agrees to 
that. 
' And at the very least, our pre-analytic inclination is 
to say a theory of personhood is false which has as its 
conclusion that we may be mistaken about our own 
personhood. We would not ordinarily be inclined to say 
that the theory is true, and that we possibly are not 
persons, or that we cannot know that we are such, as all 
the evidence is not in (namely, knowledge of future 
advances in science). I take it we intuitively believe 
that if we know anything, we know that we are persons. 
Nor could Dennett get around this by saying that if his 
concept proved empty, there would still be metaphysical, 
but not moral persons. Although this may be true, it is 
irrelevant. Presumably, our intuitions are that we cannot 
be mistaken that we are beings which have rights and 
reponsibilities and are morally accountable. 
In conclusion, if Intentional stance is constitutive 
of personhood, then Dennett has mis-characterized the 
attitude involved. In particular, we need not adopt the 
stance that an object is a second-order Intentional system 
in order for us to adopt the stance that it is a person in 
the moral sense. However, regardless of the answer to the 
guestion on how to characterize the stance in which we 
hold an X to be a person, more than simply stance, at 
least as Dennett understands it, may be involved. 
Finally, on Dennett's view, we have a set of conditions 
for personhood which is either too broad or too narrow. 
But for all of that, Dennett's attempt to come to a 
functionalist account of personhood may be of value. But 
, that is the topic for another paper. 
University of California, Santa Barbara 
1 7 6 
NOTES 
1Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, The Identities of Persons 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 175. 
Italics in original, and henceforward will be, unless 
otherwise stated. 
3Dennett will not be able to coherently maintain that 
only our species is self-aware. 
4 F o r a further explanation of why there may be no de 
re persons, see my discussion, page 18 and page 21. 
5Strictly speaking, Dennett only says that ascription 
of first and second-order Intentionality is justified by 
the predictive value of the employed Intentional 
predicates. But he would be entirely arbitrary in 
maintaining that ascription of second-order volition, 
which also has predictive value, is not also justified by 
its explanatory power. 
I should point out that although Dennett thinks his 
six conditions are not sufficient for personhood, they are 
sufficient for a thing's being a higher-order Intentional 
system, at least in the de dictu sense. 
7 . . . 
An historical note: Aristotelian physics, which 
described the motion of material objects in terms of 
volitions, did work. For example, Aristotle predicted the 
acceleration of objects toward the Earth by their desire 
to return home. The reason that mechanistic explanations 
superseded teleological ones historically was due to the 
former's semantic simplicity. As the reader can see from 
my examples, teleological explanations are usually 
semantically more complicated than mechanistic ones. But 
I am arguing that this is an irrelevant consideration for 
Dennett, or at least that it had better be such. 
Ö T h e reader may have been puzzled by the following. 
In my discussion of why Dennett's concept of personhood 
may be too braod, I talked, not about his conditions of 
personhood, but about his criterion for higher-order 
Intentional systems. A critic might say that I have only 
proved that his conditions of higher-order Intentionality 
are too broad. But the following observations can be 
made: (a) persons are higher-order Intentional systems, 
(b) higher-order Intentional systems are analogues to 
persons, as they fulfill many of the requirements of 
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personhood, namely, first-order Intentionality, 
reciprocity, and self-awareness. 
I submit that if Dennett's criterion of moral 
personhood has as a consequence that every object can be a 
quasi-person, fulfilling almost all of Dennett's necessary 
conditions, then it is too broad. And this is what we 
must face if we accept conditions (l)-(4) and (6) and the 
fact that applying these criteria to a thing is a matter 
of stance. 
Q 
See note 8. 
1 0 T h a t is, there may be no object which de re meets 
the appropriate description. 
